The reasoning criminal vs. Homer Simpson: conceptual challenges for crime science by Bouhana, N
HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
PERSPECTIVE ARTICLE
published: 23 October 2013
doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00682
The reasoning criminal vs. Homer Simpson: conceptual
challenges for crime science
Noémie Bouhana*
Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London, London, UK
Edited by:
Elena Rusconi, University College
London, UK
Reviewed by:
Elliot Berkman, University of Oregon,
USA
Nicola Lettieri, Isfol, Italy
*Correspondence:
Noémie Bouhana, Department of
Security and Crime Science,
University College London, 35
Tavistock Square, WC1H 9EZ,
London, UK
e-mail: n.bouhana@ucl.ac.uk
A recent disciplinary offshoot of criminology, crime science (CS) defines itself as ”the
application of science to the control of crime.” One of its stated ambitions is to
act as a cross-disciplinary linchpin in the domain of crime reduction. Despite many
practical successes, notably in the area of situational crime prevention (SCP), CS
has yet to achieve a commensurate level of academic visibility. The case is made
that the growth of CS is stifled by its reliance on a model of decision-making, the
Rational Choice Perspective (RCP), which is inimical to the integration of knowledge and
insights from the behavioral, cognitive and neurosciences (CBNs). Examples of salient
developments in the CBNs are provided, as regards notably multiple-system perspectives
of decision-making and approaches to person-environment interaction. Short and
long-term benefits of integration for CS are briefly outlined.
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A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION TO CRIME SCIENCE
A recent disciplinary offshoot of criminology, crime science (CS)
defines itself as “the application of science to the control of crime”
(Laycock et al., 2005; Laycock, 2008:149). Problem-driven, CS
is chiefly concerned with the design of social and technological
systems in service to the needs of stakeholders and end-users—
be they industry, government, security agencies, or the general
public. Underpinning CS and its preferred approach to crime
reduction, situational crime prevention (SCP), is the premise that
crime is best tackled by targeting its immediate causes. This focus
on proximate factors is intentionally lopsided.While the necessary
conditions of crime are defined as the intersection in time and
space of a motivated offender and a suitable target in the absence
of a capable guardian, relatively little attention has been paid to
the “offender” part of the equation. CS digs its philosophical roots
in the 18th Century Classical School, whereby Man is understood
as an essentially self-interested animal driven by desires which
he seeks to fulfill while incurring the least amount of effort.
Susceptibility to temptation is thus taken as a given and CS
looks to situational control—the removal of temptations—as the
most promising crime reduction strategy. “Opportunity makes
the thief”: remove the opportunity, increase the effort and reduce
the rewards of offending, and the crime will be prevented (Clarke,
2012).
The effectiveness of this approach has been demonstrated
against a diverse range of crime problems. The promise
of technological solutions and an emphasis on practical
problem-solving have been popular with law enforcement
agencies, and the claim was made that CS would soon eclipse
criminology departments within universities (Clarke, 2004).
However, CS has yet to achieve commensurate visibility in
the academic sphere. This paper contends that the conceptual
limitations of CS’s standard model of decision-making, the
Rational Choice Perspective (RCP), as well as the discipline’s
largely “bottom-up” research programme, hold it back from
fulfilling its stated ambition to act as a cross-disciplinary
linchpin (Laycock et al., 2005). The case is made that CS
must look to developments in the cognitive, behavioral and
neurosciences (henceforth, Cognitive and Neurosciences
(CBNs)) to address RCP’s shortcomings. Examples of
developments which suggest potential for integration are
provided. In conclusion, the benefits of integration are further
outlined.
THE CASE FOR ”BOUNDED” PARSIMONY
It is not possible to leave the offender out of crime prevention
altogether. In order to “increase effort” and “reduce rewards”,
a model of criminal decision-making is needed. For this pur-
pose, the fathers of SCP adopted the RCP (Clarke et al., 1985;
Cornish et al., 2008). As presented, RCP is not a theory per
se, but a heuristic device, a “good enough” conceptual model
which provides a schematic understanding of how offenders make
decisions—evaluating, to the best of their abilities, the costs and
benefits of their actions. Armed with this basic understanding,
the crime controller can design an array of situational techniques
to influence the offender’s decisional process away from crime
(Smith and Clarke, 2012).
While RCP has met with notable success as an engineering
heuristic, it has fallen short as a model of offender decision-
making (Wortley et al., 2013). Although the framework
acknowledges, on the one hand, the less-than-rational aspects of
offender decision-making—criminal rationality is described as
“bounded”—it implies, on the other, that the problem isn’t worth
agonizing over: a parsimonious, as-if model, unencumbered
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by the vagaries of human affect and cognition, should serve
the crime controllers well enough (Smith and Clarke, 2012).
As Wortley et al. (2013) observes, this state of affairs has had
the consequence of stifling theoretical development in CS, so
much so that RCP has remained essentially static since the
1980s. One may take Wortley’s critique further and observe that
other theoretical perspectives within the “family” of opportunity
theories—notably, the Routine Activity Approach (Cohen and
Felson, 1979)—have likewise remained relatively untouched.
Opportunity theories are still, to a large extent, axiomatic
statements rather than explanations of the causal processes which
bring crime about (Wikström et al., 2011). This is illustrated by
the oft-repeated claim that opportunities cause crime (Felson
and Clarke, 1998); for it is not, of course, the opportunity which
causes the crime, but its perception by the offender (the Thomas
Theorem in action), among other processes: opportunities,
whether provocations or temptations, are not criminal in
themselves. To address this problem, some have proposed that
the ecological concept of affordance (Gibson, 1979) should
replace opportunity in CS parlance (Pease et al., 2006). However,
affordance has yet to be integrated into the wider opportunity
control framework. To take affordance on board, a model of
criminal action is required which explains motivation in terms
of the interaction between individual and situation, instead of
postulating it as a given.
The move towards a more dynamic, interactionist model has
been resisted, for fear that it would compromise RCP’s radical
parsimony, a condition of its heuristic usefulness. Faced with evi-
dence of the non-rational features of offender decision-making,
the strategy has been to stretch the concept of “rationality” to
encompass the new phenomena. Drives to criminal action are
restated as factors in a cost-benefit analysis. Psychological rewards
(e.g., excitement), moral emotions (e.g., guilt, shame), social
inducements (e.g., status), psychobiological factors (e.g., addic-
tion), and so on, are reinterpreted in “rational” terms (e.g., Clarke
et al., 1997). This approach renders the model impregnable, but
runs roughshod over Einstein’s admonition that theory should
“make the irreducible basic elements as simple and as few as pos-
sible without having to surrender the adequate representation of a
single datum of experience” (Einstein, 1934:165, emphasis added).
The construct which explains everything explains nothing: the
more phenomena is stuffed into the construct, the emptier it
becomes. “Bounded” rather than radical parsimony would seem
the more reasonable option.
DRAWBACKS OF ”BOTTOM-UP” RESEARCH
Calls to overhaul RCP and bring the offender back into SCP have
been sounded in the past (Ekblom and Tilley, 2000; Wortley,
2001; Wortley et al., 2013), but have fallen on reluctant ears.
New SCP techniques concerned with situational precipitators
have been added to the catalogue (Cornish et al., 2003), falling
far short of a conceptual shake-up. CS’s continuing identity
struggle may explain this inertia: “science” moniker aside, CS
is fundamentally an engineering discipline, with a self-confessed
preference for short-term problem-solving (Laycock et al., 2005).
At the outset, SCP was established as the technological framework
most likely to deliver returns. A number of technological rules
and design principles, most of them implicated in opportunity
control, were identified, which produced reliable results. The
discipline’s scientific programme was thus largely circumscribed
to those research activities which provided a knowledge-base for
the design of opportunity control technologies (broadly defined),
or contributed to the testing, validation and refinement of those
technological rules and design principles at the heart of the
discipline.
Arguably, the crime scientist’s trademark question is, “So
what?” (Laycock, 2012). If the topic is not self-evidently useful
to crime control, it is not worth investigating. On the upside,
this instrumental approach, whereby CS’s engineering ambitions
dictate the discipline’s research activity, has produced reliable
analytical tools and prevention technologies, which have achieved
concrete gains in terms of crime reduction. On the downside,
this relatively narrow research agenda has done little to encour-
age inquiry driven by “big questions”. Indeed, crime scientists
have been known to take criminologists to task for studying the
“wrong” kinds of causes and failing to be more problem-oriented
(Clarke, 2004), as if only a finite number of scientific questions
about crime were worth asking.
The concern is that this “bottom-up” research agenda
has insularised CS from a wealth of knowledge in other
disciplines, notably the CBNs, as much as it has impeded
theoretical growth from within. Yet a field which looks to
medicine as a desirable model of cross-disciplinarity (Laycock
et al., 2005) needs a conceptual framework which affords
(in Gibson’s sense of the word) disciplinary integration.
Medicine and its parent disciplines share the foundations
of a systemic (chemical, biological, psychosocial, ecological,
and so on) understanding of the human organism and its
environment. To achieve its stated goal, CS needs, if not a
unified framework, then conceptual models which are not
inimical to neighboring research programmes. As a first step,
opportunity perspectives should clarify what they mean by
“bounded rationality” and formulate explicit mechanisms
of person-situation interaction (which will also necessitate
a clear definition of “situation”; Snyder, 2013). Examples
of developments in the CBNs may illustrate the value of
integration.
ENTERS HOMER SIMPSON, STAGE RIGHT
The outsider looks on with envy at the effervescence which has
characterized the growth and, increasingly, the integration of the
CBNs in recent years. Given the breakneck speed of research in
these domains, an overview isn’t attempted, but it is noteworthy
that the surge of activity has often been accompanied, if not
triggered, by an empirical challenge to single-factor (notably
rationalist) models and theories.
In social psychology, dual-process models (Evans, 2003;
Mischel et al., 2004; Kahneman et al., 2005; Kahneman, 2011)
followed from observations that departures from classical
rationality are an ubiquitous feature of human thinking
(Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman, 2011). In moral psychology,
dual models of moral judgment have likewise emerged which
call into question the Kholbergian view of moral development,
adopting instead an adaptationist perspective in which moral
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intuitions underpinmoral judgment as much as moral reasoning,
if not more so (Haidt, 2001; Greene and Gazzaniga, 2009;
Cushman et al., 2010).
Of particular interest, given SCP’s original borrowing of the
rational perspective from economics, has been the development
of behavioral economics, which built upon social psychology’s
insights to address commonly observed violations of the standard
neo-classic model (Thaler, 1991; Mullainathan et al., 2001). As
Camerer et al. (2004) put it, “At the core of behavioral economics
is the conviction that increasing the realism of the psychological
underpinnings of economic analysis will improve economics on
its own terms—generating theoretical insights, making better
predictions of field phenomena, and suggesting better policy.” The
scientific gain, behavioral economists feel, is worth renouncing
the seductive (i.e., simple and clear-cut), but ultimately mislead-
ing, solutions proposed by standard models. While neo-classical
economics would like people to think like Mr. Spock, the average
human being is rather closer to Homer Simpson (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008). Policies aimed at improving anything from indi-
vidual health to personal finances, road safety, energy savings,
and so on, are better designed while keeping Springfield’s most
famous resident in mind. Boosted by these developments in
behavioral economics, neuroeconomics has set out to open the
“black box” of the economic brain (Camerer et al., 2005), pro-
gressively adding detail to an “emorational” organ (Oullier et al.,
2010) constituted of neural systems so enmeshed it makes little
sense to study decision-making without reference to emotional
states (Sanfey et al., 2006), or—another fundamental revision
to the standard models—without reference to the socio-physical
environment.
THE FUTURE’S BRIGHT, THE FUTURE’S INTERACTIVE
The emphasis on system interaction within the organism
has been accompanied by growing attention to organism-
environment interaction. Given the importance of self-control
to the explanation of criminal behavior (Tooby and Cosmides,
2007), research on self-regulation is particularly instructive,
revealing self-control to be less of a fixed “trait” than a complex
situational mechanism. How much of this resource individuals
may draw on in any given circumstance is influenced by
situational features, as well as individual factors. Self-control
can be depleted by the prior exercise of self-control (Baumeister
et al., 2007) and by the exercise of choice between alternatives
(Vohs et al., 2008), with implications for the subsequent ability to
self-monitor, cope with stress, control aggression, think logically,
and so on. It can be depleted vicariously by watching others
exercise restraint (Ackerman et al., 2009), but can also be restored
vicariously by taking on the perspective of others engaged in
self-control replenishing activities (Egan et al., 2012). Relevantly,
self-regulatory depletion is associated with unethical behavior in
well-intentioned individuals, though much less so in individuals
with highly internalized moral standards, plausibly because
they do not need to engage in higher cognitive processes, but
automatically disregard the opportunity to behave unethically
(Gino et al., 2011). This observation would seem to support
situational action models of moral rule-breaking (Svensson et al.,
2010).
More generally, self-regulation is sensitive to cognitive load.
Decisions-making in environments which impose a high cogni-
tive burden on individuals can lead to greater reliance on (more
economical) automated decision-making, which in turn can lead
to cognitive shortcuts, such as racial stereotyping (Burgess, 2010).
Research into the causes of self-defeating decision-making among
the poor suggests that the very conditions that define poverty,
such as scarcity, impact decision-making through biosocial mech-
anisms which produce attentional shifts, self-control depletion,
and reduce cognitive capacity generally (Spears, 2010; Shah et al.,
2012; Mani et al., 2013). Self-regulation depletion also appears
affected by self-belief, whereby individuals’ implicit theories of
willpower moderate self-control depletion (Job et al., 2010). Over-
all, modern research offers an increasingly sophisticated picture
of self-control as a fluctuating resource subject to the interaction
of an array of individual and socio-contextual factors (see Inzlicht
and Schmeichel, 2012). It also suggests avenues to integrate mech-
anistically so-called “root causes” (e.g., poverty) and situational
choice perspectives, traditionally at odds in the context of crime
studies.
Interaction is, naturally, a chief concern of those disciplines
working within an adaptationist framework. In the context of evo-
lutionary psychology, “rationality” is not portrayed as a universal
construct; rather, processes are understood as domain-specific
and may produce “faulty” choices when considered from another
behavioral domain’s point-of-view. In this sense, rationality is not
so much bounded as ecological (Tooby and Cosmides, 2007). This
perspective suggests a framework for the continued development
of still-rare ecological studies of criminal decision-making (Snook
et al., 2011). It might be worthwhile in that context to explore
how domain-specific processes relate (or not) to domain-general
processes (Chiappe and MacDonald, 2005), as well as to niche
construction (Laland and Brown, 2006).
Beyond functional explanations, evolutionary perspectives of
human development have yielded constructs such as “differential
susceptibility to the environment” and “biological sensitivity to
context”, which add to an understanding of the role of individual
differences in the outcome of person-environment interactions
(Ellis et al., 2011). They suggest that heightened vulnerability to
context runs both ways—some individuals are more susceptible
to both negative and positive influences—and raise intriguing
questions as to the persistent effect, if any, of this susceptibility
into adulthood. Even these exceedingly brief examples suggest
significant potential to progress CS’s take on person-situation
interaction beyond its (relatively) primitive state.
SOWHAT?
The preceding should not be taken as an entreaty for crime
scientists to give up their preferred methods and reach for the
fMRI—though, as with previous successful imports from epi-
demiology (e.g., Bowers and Johnson, 2004), greater integra-
tion will likely result in substantial methodological gains. Nor
is it a demand to adopt any given approach wholesale. Indeed,
the most onerous part of the conceptual shift advocated here
will be to keep up with fundamental debates internal to other
disciplines (e.g., Bolhuis et al., 2011). It should, however, be
taken as a plea for scientific realism, for the development of
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theories of human behavior which go beyond axiomatic, “as-if”
theoretical frameworks to specify the constellation of biosocial
mechanisms which account for the phenomenon (Bunge et al.,
2006). As it stands, CS’s standard model, RCP, isolates it from
a wealth of knowledge in contemporary disciplines. This is a
major obstacle to the development of a modern science of crime
prevention.
This proposal for a more modern approach to conceptual
development should not be interpreted, either, as a request to
relinquish the problem-solving side of the business. Tackling
practical problems generates hypotheses and throws up invalu-
able challenges to theoretical assumptions. Furthermore, embrac-
ing the CBN knowledge-base is bound to open up short-term
avenues for crime prevention engineering. Research on the dele-
terious effects of cognitive load on healthcare decision-making
already suggests that environmental changes, learned routines and
“reflective practice” could improve the performance of crime con-
trollers working in stressful settings (Burgess, 2010). Understand-
ing the rewards associated with automated brain processes hints at
strategies to tackle resistance to change in law enforcement orga-
nizations (Becker and Cropanzano, 2010). Experiments which
elicit moral emotions such as disgust, combinedwith eye-tracking
studies of anti-smoking warnings, could inform the design and
evaluation of crime prevention publicity campaigns (see Oullier
and Sauneron, 2010). Likewise, neuroimaging studies of the Ulti-
matum Game—which investigate why participants “irrationally”
turn down money when faced with offers perceived as unfair—
might help crime controllers understand why “rational” crime
prevention advice is sometimes spiritedly rejected by potential
victims (such as advice which suggests women should alter their
behavior to prevent sexual assault).
More ambitiously, the convergence of cognitive neuroscience,
social psychology, architecture (e.g., Sternberg and Wilson,
2006), consumer studies (e.g., Mick et al., 2004), and crime
prevention might inspire interdisciplinary research into the
design of “neurocognitively sustainable” environments, which
would aim to minimize deleterious interaction (in terms of
cognitive overload, depletion of self-control, and so on), with the
prospect of benefit diffusion across multiple categories of social
problems. The perspective of a wide-ranging contribution from
evolutionary psychology has already captured the imagination
of crime scientists (Roach and Pease, 2013), though reminders
that adaption is an onerous explanatory concept, and that
accounts of ultimate (evolutionary) causes must be accompanied
by an understanding of proximal (e.g., neuropsychological)
mechanisms, should be heeded (de Waal, 2002). In criminology,
embryonic comparative research into the executive functioning
of white collar criminals (Raine et al., 2012) hints at the
possibility of tailoring prevention technologies by offending
type. Executive functioning—self-regulation, but also the
functions which underpin cognitive adaptability and flexibility—
is likely to be a fruitful area of research for CS should it seek
to account more deeply for the failure of many criminals
to displace. When explaining human behavior, evaluating
causal factors in isolation makes poor sense. A science of
crime prevention should become comfortable with multilevel
theorizing.
This paper proceeded from a simple premise: that a scientific
discipline which aims to capture the imagination of future gener-
ations of researchers cannot exist only to solve practical problems;
it must also set out to answer fundamental questions. While tech-
nology must be simple enough for end-users to implement, the
science which is the bedrock of these technologies should be as
complex as it needs to be. “Good enough” theory surrenders too
much of experience to be worth the short-term benefits to any
scientific discipline.
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